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For most of its history, Sweden has been a country dominated by the Lutheran Church, 
having the status of the official state religion. Starting in mid-to-late 20th century, mass 
immigration to Europe had a considerable impact on the confessional structure of Swe-
den’s population. The growing number of refugees from the Balkan Peninsula, the Middle 
East, and Africa has turned Sweden into a multi-religious state. Sweden has become one 
of the leaders among the EU countries as far as the growth rates of adherents of Islam 
are concerned. Immigrants are exposed to adaptation difficulties causing their social, 
cultural and geographical isolation and making relatively isolated migrant communities 
emerge. This study aims at finding correlation between the changes in the confessional 
structure of Swedish population (as a result of the growing number of non-Christians) 
and the geographical structure of migrant flows into the country. This novel study ad-
dresses the mosaic structure of the Swedish religious landscape taking into account the 
cyclical dynamics of replacement of Protestantism by Islam. The methods we created 
make it possible to identify further trends in the Swedish religious landscape. This study 
adds to results of the complex sociological and demographic studies of the confessional 
structure of the Swedish population.
Keywords:  
Sweden, migration, confessional structure of population, religious landscape, Islam, 
refugees, parallel communities
Introduction
Globalisation driving economic and demographic polarisation in different re-
gions worldwide intensifies migration processes [1]. Thus, in 1990 there were 
153 million international migrants in the world (2.9% of the world’s population) 
whereas by mid-2019 the number of international migrants went beyond 272 mil-
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lion people (3.5 % of the world’s population). Moreover, this number is expected 
to keep growing1. Jacques Attali, Alvin Toffler and other globalisation philoso-
phers believe that the mere existence of the global world that, according to Thom-
as Friedman, has become ‘flat’ [2], is related to forming a nomadic civilisation, a 
civilisation of new nomads [3; 4].
Most researchers admit that social, demographic, economic, and political 
factors [5; 6] define the nature and intensity of global migration processes. We 
would like to add to this list another factor that drives migration worldwide, and 
that has become particularly relevant due to globalisation. This factor means that 
in the modern world, different countries and regions tend to become more and 
more heterogeneous in terms of religions, cultures and ethnicities. As a result of 
mass migration, numerous parallel communities (diasporas, ethnic and religious 
minorities) emerge. Considering the low growth rate of ‘indigenous’ population 
in North America and Europe, the share of migrants in the population keeps 
growing. The migration crisis of 2014—2016 that caused millions of people 
from Asia and Africa come to Europe has immensely aggravated the problems 
of social and cultural adaptation of migrants to the life in the host societies [7]. 
These problems have become particularly pressing in countries that host more 
migrants from Islamic countries, especially in Sweden.
Some Russian experts in foreign affairs (like Leonid Fituni and Irina Abram-
ova) note that members of parallel migrant communities tend to escape from the 
new reality concentrating in enclaves, to refuse to integrate into the European 
civil society, and to create parallel bodies of power [8]. Members of such parallel 
communities maintain close relations with their country of origin and their rel-
atives who stayed there, thus increasing the migrant flow from that country and 
inhibiting the cultural assimilation of the diaspora, as it was noticed by German 
researcher Thilo Sarrazin [9, p. 259—260]. On the other hand, as it was no-
ticed by Anatoliy Vishnevsky, the eminent Russian demographer, in a globalised 
environment migration flows may become bridges between different civilisa-
tions, countries and nations [10, p. 319—325]. In this connection, we should 
note that diasporas play a crucial role in establishing economic relations between 
the country of origin of its members and their new homeland and that different 
migrant organisations drive integration of their members into the new social and 
cultural environment by helping them in terms of accommodation, employment 
or education.
Nevertheless, intensification of migration processes that cause emerging of 
parallel communities in the developed countries with low birth rates may result 
in ‘indigenous’ population gradually becoming a minority. This process is known 
as a ‘third demographic transition’. According to David Coleman, a British de-
mographer, the author of this concept, the benchmark for this transition is ‘a pri-
1 United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Population Division. Interna-
tional Migration. URL: www.unmigration.org (access date: 20.11.2019).
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ori, a decline of former majority (indigenous) populations to below of 50 per cent 
of the total’ [11, p. 32]. In this connection, Russian demographer Mikhail Klupt 
emphasises that ‘this transition results in developing world moving westwards’ 
[12, p. 67].
Materials and methodology
The research is based on national statistical sources detailing the structure 
of migration traffic to Sweden as well as the location of migrants within the 
country2. The information about affiliation in Sweden and countries generating 
migrant traffic to it is put to analysis basing on consolidated sources of statis-
tical data3, including public opinion polls [13—15] and monographic reference 
books [16].
We propose to use the Modified Fractionalisation Index (MFI) [17] as the 
key indicator of changes in components and structure of the religious landscape. 
We have created this index while studying the religious environment in different 
countries by eliminating several drawbacks in the Ekkel’s Fractionalisation Index 
[18], which is often used by Russian researchers:
��� � � � ∑ ��
�����
� � ���   ,
where πi is the impact of the i
th actor on the situation structure (or the share of this 
actor in such a structure) by a certain parameter; m is the number of actors.
In any case, MFI may have values varying in the interval from 0 to 1. Dividing 
it by segments, we get the following subinterval values for fractionalisation by 
this or that parameter: 0.000—0.280 means extremely homogeneous; 0.281—
0.556 means relatively homogeneous; 0.557—0.820 means relatively heteroge-
neous; 0.821—1.000 means extremely heterogeneous [19, p. 129].
Our hypothesis implying that religious landscape dynamics has a cyclic nature 
shaped by competition of religions [19, p. 173—204] is quite in line with the ideas 
by David Coleman about the third demographic transition. The cycle of supplan-
tation one religion by another may be triggered by the migration of adepts of the 
religion that will compete with the one that previously prevailed in the religious 
landscape of the hosting country. Our calculations show that on average, such a 
cycle lasts for 106 years. It consists of 4 stages (initial supplantation, sustainable 
supplantation, parity, and final supplantation) each having a certain duration and 
special impact on the structure of the religious landscape (see Table 1).
2 Statistiska centralbyrån (SCB). URL: https://www.scb.se (access date: 15.10.2019).
3 Brown D., James P. Religious Characteristics of States Dataset Project: Demographics v. 
2.0 (RCS-Dem 2.0), COUNTRIES ONLY. URL: http://www.thearda.com/Archive/Files/
Descriptions/RCSDEM2.asp (access date: 18.11.2019).
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Table 1
The phase duration and running conditions that comprise  
the “average” religious competition cycle
Phase Duration, years
Running conditions
Values of MFI Structure of confes-sional landscape 
Initial supplantation 18 MFI ∈
(0,000; 0,280]
Share of the religion
under supplantation 
≥ 87 %
Stable supplantation 21 MFI ∈
[0,281; 0,556]




Parity 29 MFI ∈
[0,557; 1,000] 
∈[1,000; 0,557]




Final supplantation 38 MFI ∈
[0,556; 0,000)
Share of the religion
under supplantation 
< 30 %
Source: [19, p. 225].
Results and Discussion
In Sweden, demographic development has always been influenced mainly by 
external migration. Since the Middle Ages, Sweden has been receiving migrants 
from Northern Germany, mainly merchants and artisans. In the 17th century, the 
discovery of significant iron reserves attracted Walloon Protestants who taught 
ironworking to their new compatriots4. They flew from the territories that now 
belong to Belgium in virtue of religious persecution.
Since the 16th century, Lutheranism has become the official religion in Swe-
den, and the activities of other religious organisations were restricted. A royal 
edict of 1617 prohibited non-Lutherans to permanently live in Sweden; preachers 
of other religions had the same status as high traitors and were prosecuted to the 
fullest extent of the law, including death penalty. That is why it was difficult for 
non-Protestants to migrate to Sweden.
As time went by, Swedish law became more liberal in terms of religious free-
dom. Thus, in 1858 the law that prohibited religious assemblies outside the church 
houses was abolished; since 1870 non-Lutherans were no more prohibited to go 
in for politics; since 1880 it is permitted to change religion [20]; finally in 2000 
Lutheran Church lost its status of the official church of Sweden [21]. Neverthe-
4 Sweden and migration. URL: https://sweden. se/migration (access date: 19.11.2019).
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less, for quite a long time religious liberalisation did not entail any considerable 
increase in the share of the non-Protestant population in Sweden, so Protestant-
ism (in the form of Lutheranism) has prevailed in Sweden’s religious landscape.
Consequently, until the mid-20th century migration inflow had no significant 
impact on the ethnical or confessional structure of the Swedish population. As 
a whole, the country remained mono-ethnic and mono-religious, and most of 
the migrants managed to become naturalised and even to accept the dominating 
Lutheranism.
After the Second World War, Sweden faced increasing migrant inflow, which 
was mainly due to the favourable economic situation there. As the Swedish econ-
omy proliferated after the war, it was in desperate need of labour force. In 1950, 
there were 198,000 migrants (which accounted for 2.8 % of the country’s popula-
tion): half of them originated from the neighbouring Scandinavian countries,  and 
more than one third came from other countries of Europe (see Table 2).
56
Table 2
Structure of immigration to Sweden by region of origin, 1950—1980
Region and country 
of migrants’ birth 
Year
1950 1960 1970 1980
thousand pers. thousand pers. thousand pers. thousand pers.
Nordic countries1 
except Sweden 99,1 174,0 320,9 341,2
Finland 44,8 101,3 234,5 251,3
EU-282 except the 
Nordic countries 76,2 76,0 139,2 151,3
Poland 7,8 6,3 10,8 20,0
Germany 21,6 37,6 41,8 39,0
UK 2,1 2,7 5,4 8,2
Greece 0,0 0,3 11,8 15,1
Hungary 2,0 8,5 10,6 12,9
Rest of Europe 9,3 35,1 48,2 61,2
Yugoslavia 0,2 1,5 33,8 38,0
USSR 8,1 31,9 7,2 6,8
Turkey 0,1 0,2 3,8 14,4
Asia 0,9 1,5 5,9 30,3
North America 11,3 11,7 15,6 14,5
South America 0,4 0,7 2,3 17,2
Chile 0,0 0,0 0,2 8,3
Africa 0,3 0,6 4,1 10,0
Total 197,8 299,9 537,6 626,9
Source: Compiled by the authors based on: Folkmängd efter födelseland 1900—2018. 
Statistiska centralbyrån (SCB). URL: https://www.scb.se (access date: 19.11.2019).
5 In this article Nordic countries stand for Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, and Finland.
6 In this article the composition of the EU is considered as on January 1, 2020.
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After the migration law was liberalised in the 1950s, Swedish labour market 
faced a considerable inflow of migrant workers7 mostly coming from Scandina-
vian countries, Germany and countries of Eastern Europe (Yugoslavia and Baltic 
republics of the USSR). The postwar migration inflow to Sweden lasted till the 
late 1970s when the government stopped supporting labour migration. The post-
war migrant inflow was relatively homogeneous, consisting mainly of Western 
Christians.
In the period from 1950 to 1970, migrant flows to Sweden was predominantly 
generated by one region — Scandinavia. Thus, in 1970 the share of migrants 
coming from Scandinavian countries reached its maximum of almost 60 % (about 
3/4 of them coming from Finland). During the same period, more than 25 % of 
migrants came from the countries that are now members of the EU. Only about 
15 % of migrants came from elsewhere. If we further calculate the MFI by home 
countries of migrants, during the period from 1950 to 1970 its value decreased 
reaching its minimum in Sweden’s recent history, i.e. in 1970 it was recorded as 
0.789 for the first time changing from extreme heterogeneity to relative hetero-
geneity (Table 3).
Table 3
Dynamics of MFI for immigrants and shares of religious communities  
in Sweden population, 1950—1980 
Index 1950 1960 1970 1980
MFI of the flow of immigrants 
to Sweden 0,887 0,837 0,789 0,825
MFI of the religious population 
of Sweden 0,037 0,035 0,065 0,123
Proportion of Protestants in the 
religious population,% 98,354 98,376 96,991 94,171
Proportion of Catholics in the 
religious population,% 0,397 0,430 0,973 1,509
Proportion of Orthodox Chris-
tians in the religious popula-
tion,% 
0,079 0,162 0,519 1,022
Proportion of Muslims in the 
religious population,% 0,016 0,028 0,176 1,556
Proportion of religious popula-
tion in Sweden,% 90,014 82,609 75,204 73,840
Source: Compiled by the authors based on Brown D., James P. Religious Characteris-
tics of States Dataset Project: Demographics v. 2.0 (RCS-Dem 2.0), COUNTRIES ONLY. 
URL: http://www.thearda.com/Archive/Files/Descriptions/RCSDEM2.asp (access date: 
18.11.2019).
7 Sweden and Migration. Post war immigration. Swedish Institute (SI). URL: https://sweden.
se/migration/#1940 (access date: 17.02.2020).
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However, after 1970s migrant flows to Sweden became more heterogeneous 
with more people coming from Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Europe outside 
the EU. Changes in the geographic structure of migrant flows to Sweden resulted 
in increased MFI value by migrants’ homeland. In 1980 it reached 0.825, thus 
returning to extreme heterogeneity.
In average, more than 70—75 % of post-war migrants came to Sweden from 
countries having much in common in terms of their culture, history and religion. 
This is why before 1970, the decrease of Lutherans’ share in Sweden’s religious 
landscape was almost unnoticeable. However, the MFI value of Sweden’s reli-
gious population was sustainably growing after World War II, which means that 
the share of non-Protestants in the country grew due to a more diversified migrant 
inflow [22].
Most migrants coming from Poland, Hungary and Latin America are Cath-
olics; those who come from Greece or Romania are predominantly Ortho-
dox Christians; those who come from Turkey and Iran are mostly Muslims; 
whereas natives of Yugoslavia may be Muslims, Catholics or Orthodox Chris-
tians, depending on their ethnicity. In such a way, the confessional structure 
of the Swedish population is mainly shaped by migration and not by religious 
conversion, which is not at all typical for the Swedes. While analysing the 
confessional structure of the Swedish population, we consider only the reli-
gious people, since active secularisation processes have made many Swedes 
religiously unaffiliated, just like migrants from Scandinavian countries and 
Western Europe [23; 24].
In overall, during the period from 1950 to 1980, the number of Catholics in 
Sweden has increased almost fourfold; Orthodox Christians became 12.5 times 
more numerous, whereas the number of Muslims has increased almost hundred-
fold. Postwar migration resulted in appearing of other religious communities, 
like Buddhists from China and Thailand, Bahais from Iran etc. Thus, as the re-
ligious landscape in Sweden is becoming more mosaic, there appear religions 
that can potentially compete with Lutheranism, i.e. trigger the cycle of religious 
competition changing the country’s religious landscape.
In the late 1970s, when the economy and the employment rate in the industrial 
sector took the downward trend, the structure of immigration flows to Sweden 
started to change due to a decrease in demand for workforce. Labour permits 
were issued only to migrants coming from Scandinavian countries, and since 
1995 to the EU citizens too. This is why refugees and immigrants from develop-
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ing countries replace labour migrants from developed countries. It is essential to 
emphasise that culture and religion in the majority of developing countries differ 
considerably from the ones prevailing in Sweden [25]. In Sweden, migration pol-
icy was rather humanistic, and the country proclaimed itself as a ‘humanitarian 
superpower’8. As the country emphasised protection of human rights, receiving 
refugees who sought to be rescued from political repressions, wars, poverty, and 
famine was largely supported by the Swedish society.
We can trace several migration waves in Sweden’s recent history. In the 1970s, 
Sweden received refugees from Chile who were fleeing from military dictator-
ship by Augusto Pinochet as well as migrants from Uganda who were seeking 
refuge from the regime of Idi Amin. Later, in the 1980s, there were refugees of 
the war between Iran and Iraq [26].
In the 1990s, there started mass migration of refugees to Sweden. Its first 
peak was due to the flow of migrants (mostly Bosnians) from the former Yugo-
slavia then facing the civil war. For instance, only in 1992 (the record-setting 
year in terms of the number of refugees) Sweden granted asylum to 84,000 mi-
grants mostly coming from the former Yugoslavia. Besides, Sweden received 
refugees from the Middle East and the Horn of Africa who sought safety be-
cause of military conflicts and economic insecurity faced by their countries 
(Table 4).
In the 2000s, the flows of migrants from these regions kept increasing due 
to many reasons. Firstly, the law of Sweden guarantees the right of families for 
reunification, so relatives of migrants headed for Sweden. About 50 % of all the 
migrants coming to Sweden since the 1990s sought the reunification of their 
families [27]. Secondly, the situation in countries generating migrant traffic to 
Sweden did not improve. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 caused the migrant 
traffic from that country to triple within just a decade. To give an example, in 
2007 Södertälje, a small city near Stockholm, received 1,268 immigrants from 
Iraq, i.e. more refugees than were received by the USA and Canada together 
during that year.9
8 Новую волну иммигрантов Швеция тоже выдержит // Radio Sweden Russian. URL: 
https://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=2103&amp;artikel=5945202 (access 
date: 22.11.2019).




Structure of immigration to Sweden by region of origin, 1990—2018
Region 
and country  
of migrants’ birth 
Year
1990 2000 2010 2018
thousand pers. thousand pers. thousand pers. thousand pers.
Nordic countries 
except Sweden 319,1 279,6 263,2 235,6
Finland 217,6 195,4 169,5 147,9
EU-28 except the 
Nordic countries 175,7 193,1 274,2 369,7
Poland 35,6 40,1 70,2 92,8
Germany 37,8 38,1 48,2 51,1
Romania 8,8 11,8 19,7 31,0
Rest of Europe 71,2 169,3 216,0 259,2
Yugoslavia 43,3* 72,0 70,8 65,1
Bosnia and Herze-
govina ... 51,5 62,1 59,4
Turkey 25,2 31,9 42,5 50,0
Asia 124,4 220,7 410,1 745,3
Syria 5,9 14,2 20,8 186,0
Iraq 9,8 49,4 121,8 144,0
Iran 40,1 51,1 62,1 77,4
Afghanistan 0,5 4,3 14,4 52,0
Thailand 5,0 10,4 31,4 42,4
India 9,1 11,1 17,9 35,2
North America 19,1 24,3 31,3 40,1
South America 44,2 50,9 63,7 72,5
Africa 27,3 55,1 114,9 219,9
Somalia 1,4 13,1 37,9 68,7
Eritrea ... 3,1 10,3 42,3
Total 790,4 1003,8 1384,9 1955,6
Source: Compiled by the authors based on: Folkmängd efter födelseland 1900—2018. 
Statistiska centralbyrån (SCB). URL: https://www. scb. se (access date: 19.11.2019).
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The next wave of refugees to Sweden was a result of the Arab Spring in 
2011, and the events that followed it in the countries of the Middle East, in-
cluding the civil wars that broke out in Syria and Iraq. These events generat-
ed more massive refugee traffic from the Middle East and Africa to Europe, 
thus entailing a migration crisis there. Comparing to other European countries, 
Sweden has received the largest number of refugees per capita. For instance, 
in 2014 the country hosted 81,000 refugees, and in 2015 (the peak year of the 
migration crisis) Sweden received more than 162,000 asylum applicants10. In 
2014, every fifth immigrant in Sweden was a Syrian native, whereas in 2015 
almost every fourth immigrant arrived from Syria. In 2017 Syrians became the 
most numerous group of migrants to Sweden outnumbering the Finns who had 
been holding the first position in these terms since the beginning of the 20th 
century. The Iraqis are holding the third position being slightly inferior to the 
Finns in number11.
In the 2010s, the most fast-growing groups of migrants to Sweden come from 
Afghanistan, Eritrea, Somalia, India, and Iran. Today, more than 50 % of all the 
migrants arriving in Sweden either apply for asylum or seek reunification of their 
families.
In 1990—2018, the geography of countries generating migrant flows to Swe-
den has become broader, which is evidenced by higher MFI value for the mi-
gration flow structure. This diversification was contributed by more migrants 
coming from Asia and Africa, which naturally entails changes in the religious 
landscape of the hosting country. Most of the migrants coming from Syria, Iraq, 
Iran, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Somalia, Kosovo and almost half 
of the migrants coming from Eritrea are Muslims. Our assessment shows that, 
considering the confessional structure of the population in the countries that gen-
erate immigrant traffic to Sweden, Muslims account for more than 80 % of the 
migrants. This is why the share of Muslims was the most fast-growing segment 
of Sweden’s religious landscape. The peaks in the number of Muslims in Sweden 
were recorded in the 1990s and after 2010, which historically matches the two 
significant waves of refugee flows to Sweden: the one from Yugoslavia and Bos-
nia, and the one from Syria and Iraq (Table 5).
10 Migration Policy Debates N°13 January 2017. OECD. URL: www.oecd.org/migration (ac-
cess date: 18.11.2019).
11 Utrikes födda samt födda i Sverige med en eller två utrikes födda föräldrar efter födelseland/
ursprungsland, 31 december 2018, totalt. URL: https://www.scb.se (access date: 20.11.2019).
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Table 5
Dynamics of MFI for immigrants and shares of religious communities  
in the population of Sweden, 1990—2018
Index 1990 2000 2010 2018
MFI of the flow of immigrants to 
Sweden 0,910 0,946 0,964 0,971
MFI of the religious population of 
Sweden 0,183 0,228 0,260 0,311
Proportion of Protestants in the 
religious population,% 91,160 88,566 86,856 83,371
Proportion of Catholics in the 
religious population,% 1,713 1,934 2,194 2,248
Proportion of Orthodox Christians 
in the religious population,% 1,539 2,083 2,036 1,903
Proportion of Muslims in the 
religious population,% 2,998 6,265 7,754 13,850
Proportion of religious population 
in Sweden,% 72,477 71,113 68,485 67,050
Source: Compiled by the authors based on Brown D., James P. Op. cit.
During the period from 1990 to 2018, the share of Muslims in Sweden’s reli-
gious population increased more than 4.6-folds. Today Muslims account for al-
most 14 % of the religious population in the country, and according to our calcu-
lations, Sweden is home for 950,000 Muslims. The share of Catholics increased 
by 1.3 (which is mainly due to more migrants coming from Poland), whereas 
the share of Orthodox Christians has slightly decreased. During the same period, 
considerable groups of adherents of other religions appeared in Sweden. Each 
group is genetically linked to a particular group of migrants. Thus, most of the 
Hindus come from India and Sri Lanka, most of Buddhists come from China and 
Thailand, most of the Bahais come from Iran, most of the adherents of Alevism 
come from Turkey, most of Yazidis and Mandaeans12 come from Iraq. The fact 
that migration has turned Sweden into a multi-religious country is supported by 
higher MFI values for the religious population with their peaks chronologically 
matching the years when maximum refugees arrived in Sweden (the 1990s and 
the 2010s).
Today’s Sweden is literally a country of migrants. In 2018, 930,000 of its resi-
dents (i.e. 9.1 % of the country’s population) were citizens of other countries, and 
more than 1.2 million of Swedish citizens were born abroad. In overall, Sweden 
is the home country for 2.5 million people (i.e. almost 25 % of the country’s pop-
12 Mandaeans are the adherents of an ancient Gnostic religion that appeared in the Southern 
Iraq and that survived till our days. As a result of migration, Sweden is home of the largest 
group of Mandaeans in the world (11 thousand pers.) [28].
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ulation) having foreign origins, which means that either they were born abroad 
or at least one of their parents was born abroad13. In terms of their geography, 
migrants are located in Sweden in a quite uneven manner with more than half of 
them concentrated in 3 of the country’s 21 läns (counties). These are Stockholm, 
Västra Götaland, and Skåne where the country’s largest municipalities (Stock-
holm, Gothenburg, and Malmö) are located. The same three läns host almost 60 
% of migrants coming to Sweden from Islamic states. Muslims are particularly 
numerous in the län of Stockholm, home for 27 % of the country’s Muslims, i.e. 
about 260,000 people that accounts for more than 22 % of the total län’s believ-
ers. About 80 % of the population in Rinkeby, northwestern district of Stockholm 
municipality (sometimes nicknamed Little Mogadishu), adhere to Islam. The sit-
uation is almost the same in Rosengård (a district of Malmö) with almost 86 % of 
its inhabitants being of foreign origin, most of them come from Iraq, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Lebanon, Somalia Afghanistan and other (predominantly Muslim) 
countries14.
The fact that since the 1990s Sweden predominantly receives immigrants ad-
hering to other cultures and other religions, makes it rather hard to ensure their 
integration into the Swedish society (and in case of Muslim immigrants this is 
closing in on impossible)15, contributes to their social degradation and criminal-
isation and results in emerging of parallel migrant communities. Parallel com-
munities are concentrated in the so-called ‘vulnerable areas’, enclaves where the 
state monopoly on law enforcement is challenged by the institutions of traditional 
leadership based on the Islamic religious rules that are not quite in line with 
the West European liberal values. In 2017, the country had 61 vulnerable areas 
inhabited by 560,000 people (more than 5 % of the country’s population)16. Ac-
cording to the Swedish police, these vulnerable areas host 5,000 criminals and 
200 criminal networks. Government of Sweden has proclaimed 23 of these areas 
with a total population of 200,000 people to be ‘Especially vulnerable’, almost 
uncontrolled by the authorities [29, p. 136]. These include Rinkeby in Stockholm 
and Rosengård in Malmö.
In such a way, it took the external migrants only 50 years to transform Swe-
den’s religious landscape. Migration flows to the country grew more diversified 
due to more migrants coming mostly from Islamic countries, which resulted in the 
13 Befolkningsstatistik i sammandrag 1960—2018. URL: https://www.scb.se (access date: 
20.11.2019).
14 Sweden and migration. URL: https://sweden.se/migration (access date: 19.11.2019).
15 Veretevskaya A.V. Muslims in Sweden: integration aggravation of the crisis. Perspektivy: 
setevoe izdanie Tsentra issledovanii i analitiki Fonda istoricheskoi perspektivy [Perspectives: 
online publication of the center for research and Analytics of the historical perspective 
Foundation]. URL: http://www.perspektivy.info/misl/cenn/musulmane_v_shvecii_obostrenije_ 
integracionnogo_krizisa_2013-09-12.htm (access date: 19.11.2019).




growing share of Muslims in the country’s population thus triggering the cycle 
of replacement of Protestantism with Islam in the religious landscape of Sweden. 
The first stage of this cycle of religious competition (initial supplantation) started 
in 1994 when Muslim migrant inflow from Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na, Iran, and Iraq reached its maximum. The fact that the religious landscape in 
Sweden had undergone the initial supplantation stage of the religious competition 
cycle is supported by the MFI value for the religious population that remained 
below 0.280 in 2010. In contrast, the share of adherents of Islam in the country 
grew to almost 8 %.
The next peak of Muslim migration to Sweden was in 2014—2015 when the 
country received the record number of refugees from the Middle East and the 
Horn of Africa, which triggered the second stage of the religious competition 
cycle. Thereby, in Sweden, the first stage lasted for 20—21 years, a period that 
approximately matches its average duration of 18 years. By 2018, the MFI val-
ue for the confessional structure of population had increased to 0.311, and the 
share of Muslims increased to 14 % thus matching the parameters of the next 
stage in the religious competition cycle, — the stage of sustainable supplanta-
tion. Considering that in an ideal cycle it may last for 21 years, we may sup-
pose that by 2036—2040 sustainable supplantation will give way to parity, i.e. 
by that time the share of Muslims in the religious population of Sweden may 
reach the threshold of 30 %. It is interesting to note that our forecast is in line 
with the data of Pew Research Center stating that in case intense immigration 
to Sweden continues, by 2050 the share of Muslims in the country’s population 
will have gone beyond 30 % [13]. However, parity stage has already become 
a reality in some districts of Sweden’s largest cities where the majority of the 
population is Muslim.
Conclusion
Today’s Sweden is one of the first countries in the world that in just 50 
years has turned from a monoethnic state with a dominating official religion to 
a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country. External migration became the key 
transforming factor for the Swedish society changing its cultural traditions and 
the vector of its civilisational development. Initially, this migration had an eco-
nomic background as the country’s explosively growing economy had created 
a demand for human resources. However, later, accepting migrants from the 
world’s most troublesome regions became a kind of ‘humanitarian imperative’ 
for Sweden. Growing Muslim community that is gradually becoming, and in 
some parts of the country has already become the “second majority” after the 
adherents of Lutheranism, creates serious problems for its adaptation and in-
tegration into the Swedish society. It turned out that not only the migrants but 
also the Swedes themselves adhering to different religions (and often to differ-
ent values) are not ready to coexist within one country. This is why the grow-
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ing cultural, social and geographic isolation of refugees in Sweden makes the 
sustainable parallel migrant communities emerge. The policymakers in Sweden 
are yet to develop a new migration strategy. On the one hand, the political 
parties of the ‘old’ system have reached consensus on the image of Sweden 
as a ‘multicultural humanitarian superpower’ where discrimination restrictions 
for Muslim migrants are unacceptable. On the other hand, many politicians in 
Sweden can not afford to ignore that quite many Swedes are asking to restrict 
migrant flows to the country. As a result, the new party of Sweden Democrats 
(that aims at protecting national identity and ensuring wellbeing and safety of 
Swedish citizens endangered by Muslim migrant inflow) grew very popular 
and received its record-setting 62 seats in Riksdag with 17.6 % votes [30]. Of 
course, now we can not imagine that Sweden could become a monoethnic state 
again or that being non-Protestant may be equalled to high treason. However, 
we believe that under the electorate pressure Swedish government will have to 
abolish its ‘generous’ migrant policy changing it to a more practical one, where 
receiving fewer refugees will slow down the cycle of religious competition in 
the country.
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